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Notes and Comments
Rejoinder to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘A Postfunctional
Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus
to Constraining Dissensus’
HANSPETER KRIESI*
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks outline a research programme ‘that seeks to make sense of new
developments in EU politics and the middle-range theories that account for them’.1 They argue that the
debate on Europe is grounded in domestic political conﬂict, and that this conﬂict is above all driven
by questions of identity, and not by economic preferences of interest groups, as is assumed by both
neofunctionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists. Functional interest groups are decisive only under
conditions of a permissive public opinion, i.e. under conditions of a depoliticized public. Once European
integration has started to become a key political issue, ‘integration by stealth’ has ceased to be a viable
strategy,2 and identity politics moves to centre stage. In a nutshell: ‘to understand European integration
we needy to understand how, and when, identity is mobilized’.
As a general strategy to explain why ‘the elite has to make room for a more Eurosceptical public’,
and why identity has become politically salient, the authors (more or less explicitly) propose a
two-step procedure. First, they introduce a structural tension which provides a political potential
that can be exploited by political entrepreneurs: they argue that the process of rapid jurisdictional
change in Europe has not been accompanied by a parallel change of identities. It is the tension
between the increasing scope and depth of European integration, on the one hand, and stable
national identities, on the other, that has created the latent political potential. Secondly, they
propose to use theories of strategic competition among political parties to explain under what
conditions this potential is likely to be exploited by certain political parties. This two-step approach
reminds us of the general approach taken by cleavage theories, which analogously argue that
structurally grounded conﬂicts are becoming politically salient to the extent that they are con-
sciously perceived by the groups involved and are organized into politics by some collective actors.
Kitschelt,3 for example, has applied this general strategy to the analysis of both social-democratic
* Department of Political Science, University of Zurich (email: hanspeter.kriesi@ipz.uzh.ch).
1 See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science, published online by
Cambridge University Press, 2008, doi: 10.1017/S0007123408000409, pp. 1–2. See also Philippe Schmitter,
‘On the Way to a Post-Functionalist Theory of European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science,
published online by Cambridge University Press, 2008, doi: 10.1017/S0007123408000483; and Tanja A.
Bo¨rzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Revisiting the Nature of the Beast – Politicization, European Identity, and
Postfunctionalism: A Comment on Hooghe and Marks’, British Journal of Political Science, published
online by Cambridge University Press, 2008, doi: 10.1017/S000712340800046X; also all in British Journal of
Political Science, 39 (2009).
2 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of
Integration by Stealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
3 Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994); Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).
and radical-right populist parties. Van der Brug et al.4 have used such a two-step model to explain
why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed, and we have used the same kind of
reasoning to explain the transformation of the West European party systems.5
Let us consider the ﬁrst step – the creation of structural potentials. As the authors suggest, almost in
an aside, the effects of the tension in question have been magniﬁed ‘because they are part of a broader
breakdown of national barriers giving rise to mass immigration and intensiﬁed economic competition’.
I would like to insist on this point. The European integration process should not be viewed in isolation.
It should be conceptualized as part and parcel of a larger structural conﬂict that provides the potential
for a reconstruction of domestic political conﬂicts across Europe. European integration is one of a
number of processes that currently open up and unbundle the boundaries of the nation-states. This set
of processes is generally referred to by the term of ‘globalization’, but, following Zu¨rn,6 we might refer
to it more correctly by the term ‘denationalization’. Processes of political competition (the construction
of new supranational centres of authority competing with nation-states), economic competition
(liberalization and market integration, immigration, delocalization) and cultural competition
(immigration and its multicultural consequences) put the national political community under strain.
As we have argued,7 the likely winners of these competitive processes include people with high
qualiﬁcations in sectors open to international competition as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. The
losers include the patriots who identify with the national community, the economic sectors which
have traditionally been protected by the nation-state and which ﬁnd themselves increasingly
exposed to foreign competition, as well as all those who lack the qualiﬁcations and the cultural
competence to meet the economic and cultural challenge of a globalizing world. The winners are
expected to support the opening up of the borders, including European integration, while the losers
are likely to constitute the potential for mobilization not only against European integration, but
also for mobilization against immigration and its consequences, for the backlash against the cultural
liberalism of the new social movements, and for the defence of national traditions, national privileges
and national sovereignty. In a Rokkanean perspective, we suggest that we should conceive of these
contemporary processes as constituting a new ‘critical juncture’, which is likely to result in the
formation of a new structural cleavage that we might call the conﬂict between integration and
demarcation.
This conﬂict has both an economic and a cultural dimension and it is not evident a priori why the
aspect of identity should be more important than the economic one. This can be illustrated by the
European integration process. European integration has above all been a process of making a
market. In Scharpf’s terminology,8 it has been a process of ‘negative integration’, removing the
boundaries and other obstacles to free and undistorted international economic competition. To a
more limited extent, it has also been a process of reconstructing a system of regulation at the
supranational level – a process that Scharpf calls positive integration. Both negative and positive
economic integration impinge on the problem-solving capacity of the nation-states, on the autonomy of
4 Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail
and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support’, Comparative Political Studies,
38 (2005), 537–73.
5 Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Tim Frey,
‘Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries
Compared’, European Journal of Political Research, 45 (2006), 921–57; Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande,
Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos Frey, eds, West European Politics in
the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6 Michael Zu¨rn, ‘Schwarz-Rot-Gru¨n-Braun: Reaktionsweisen auf Denationalisierung’, in Ulrich Beck,
ed., Politik der Globalisierung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 297–330.
7 Kriesi et al., ‘Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space’ (2006); Kriesi
et al., eds, West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.
8 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), p. 45.
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the national political communities and on the solidarity within these communities. In other words,
as an unanticipated consequence of the broadening and deepening of European economic integration,
it has become more difﬁcult to imagine the national communities with corresponding consequences
for those who are attached to them.
While not a priori evident, the results of our project on the transformation of the national
political space in six West European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland) support the hunch held by Hooghe and Marks that identity has become
more salient for the political mobilization of the integration–demarcation cleavage than the
economic considerations. In our analysis of the country-speciﬁc national election campaigns in
the 1970s and 1990s, we have found that economic issues have lost in salience for partisan mobil-
ization in all the countries except Germany. In the 1970s, they were more important than cultural
issues in Austria, Britain and France, while they were of roughly equal importance in Germany,
Switzerland and the Netherlands. By the year 2000, France remains the only case where economic
issues still are clearly dominant. Furthermore, among the cultural issues, those linked to the
process of denationalization, i.e. immigration and European integration, have become more
salient in national election campaigns. Following these developments, electoral competition can
no longer be reduced to a single line of conﬂict. As a consequence, voting choices are no longer
primarily determined by attitudes about economic or social policies as in the 1970s, but by
preferences with regard to cultural issues.9 The only exception to this pattern is Britain, where
economic issues are still the most important ones for the determination of the vote. But even in
this case, we observe a reinforcement of the impact of the European integration issue in the course
of the 1990s. By the 1990s, the opposition between integration and demarcation is clearly reﬂected
in the determinants of voting choices.
But why has identity become more important than economic interests? The answer to this
question is expected from the second step of the model – the strategic mobilization by political
parties. In line with Hooghe and Marks, I would argue that the opposition to the opening up of the
borders has mainly come from the radical left and from the populist right. While the radical left
mainly mobilizes in terms of economic interests, it is the right-wing populists who mobilize in
cultural terms. The radical left is mainly opposed to economic liberalization and to the threat
it poses to the left’s social achievement at the domestic level. By contrast, the populist right’s
opposition to the opening up of the borders is ﬁrst of all an opposition to the political and cultural
forms of competition and the threat they pose to national identities. Both the radical left and the
right-wing populists appeal to the interests and fears of the losers of denationalization, but the
evidence suggests that the right-wing populists did so with far greater success. They have become
the driving force of the transformation of West European party systems, while the radical left
has led a more marginal political life. The relative success of the right-wing populists can be
attributed to their speciﬁc appeal to identity. In an analysis of voting choices across the six
countries, we were able to show that cultural preferences linked to the integration–demarcation
cleavage are central to explaining votes for right-wing populist parties (and their functional
equivalents among national- or liberal-conservative parties).10 In France, where this pattern
appeared with particular clarity, class does matter for economic preference formation – even among
voters for the Front National (FN), but class no longer is the key identity for the electoral choice
of FN voters. As Bornschier’s detailed analysis of these voters suggests,11 they primarily vote
for the FN because of its defence of the national community. In other words, the identities linked to
the traditional class cleavage have suffered a decline relative to those based on national community
9 Romain Lachat, ‘The Electoral Consequences of the Integration vs. Demarcation Cleavage’, in
Kriesi et al., eds, West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.
10 Lachat, ‘The Electoral Consequences of the Integration vs. Demarcation Cleavage’.
11 Simon Bornschier, ‘The Transformation of Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Right-Wing
Populist Parties in Western Europe’ (doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of
Zurich, 2007).
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in determining political alignments in France. Contrary to Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula’,12 many
voters support the FN not because of its pro-market stance, but in spite of it.
As a large body of literature documents, the success of the right-wing populists depends on a
number of contextual circumstances. But the basis of their success lies in their appeal to identity
and their exploitation of anxieties about losing one’s identity in a denationalizing world. These
parties are so successful, because they successfully prime, frame or cue national identities. But why
does the framing of these parties resonate so well with the losers of denationalization processes?
Why does identity, and in particular national identity, resonate more with them than economic, and
in particular class, interest? My hunch is that this has to do with the particular quality of national
identities. The opening up and unbundling of national boundaries puts into question the national
community. This is particularly serious for people who, like the losers of the denationalization
process, have identiﬁed with this community, and who have not much else to be proud of. As
Greenfeld has observed, the remarkable quality of national identity, a quality that distinguishes
it from all other identities, is that it guarantees a certain amount of dignity to all members of a
political system.13 Similarly, Tamir suggests that the power of national identities can be attributed
to their capacity to endow human action with a meaning that endures over time, thus carrying a
promise of immortality.14
Much of what Hooghe and Marks suggest and what my remarks tend to support is still
very speculative, and awaits conﬁrmation by further empirical research. Hooghe and Marks
propose that we focus on the strategic interaction between political parties in order to understand
how issues are politicized. I fully agree with the general thrust of their proposal. All I would like to
add are three suggestions for its speciﬁcation. First, such a programme should extend to political
mobilization in national and European elections, as well as in non-electoral forms of contention,
including referendums which have become increasingly prominent in the context of European
integration. With regard to European elections, the proposed programme should clarify to what
extent they still constitute ‘secondary elections’ that are not really about representation at the
European level.15 At the same time, such a programme should clarify whether national electoral
contests still avoid the content or direction of EU policy.16 In other words, it should analyse
whether, as Follesdal and Hix argue, there is still no electoral contest about the leadership at the
European level or the basic direction of the EU policy agenda.17 Secondly, such a programme
should study what kind of actors politicizes which aspects of the purported new cleavage in
which arena. It should not only study political parties, but also social movement organizations
and interest groups who articulate issues related to the new cleavage in their particular arenas.
Thirdly, such a programme should attempt to clarify the respective role of cultural (identity) and
economic (class) issues in the articulation of the new cleavage. In particular, it should attempt to
explain why national identity has become such a powerful identity once again, and how it relates not
only to other kinds of identity, but also to economic interests.
12 Kitschelt and McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe.
13 Liah Greenfeld, ‘Is Nation Unavoidable? Is Nation Unavoidable Today?’ in Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus
Armingeon, Hannes Siegrist and Andreas Wimmer, eds, Nation and National Identity: The European
Experience in Perspective (Chur: Ru¨egger, 1999), pp. 37–54, at p. 52.
14 Yael Tamir, ‘The Enigma of Nationalism’; World Politics, 47 (1995), 418–40, p. 432.
15 Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, ‘Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National
Elections in Europe’, in Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, eds, European Integration and Political
Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 32–50.
16 Peter Mair, ‘The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems’, in Klaus H. Goetz and
Simon Hix, eds, European Integration and National Political Systems (London: Frank Cass, 2001),
pp. 27–51.
17 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deﬁcit in the EU: A Response to
Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, (2006), 533–62.
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